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Blalock: The Current State of Grievance Arbitration in the Coal Industry

THE CURRENT STATE OF GRIEVANCE
ARBITRATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY
The arbitration process provides for settlement of disputes
through adjudication outside the normal judicial system.1 In
many instances arbitration resolves disputes arising under the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement. This type of labor arbitration is referred to as rights arbitration, or more commonly,
grievance arbitration.2 A second type of arbitration, referred to as
interest arbitration, is concerned with settling the unresolved
terms of the collective bargaining agreement itself.3 This note will
focus solely on grievance arbitration.
Grievance arbitration has proliferated, particularly in American industry, in the wake of the United States Supreme Court's
1960 decisions in the Steelworker's Trilogy.4 The cumulative effect of these three decisions was to establish the Supreme Court's
positive attitude toward arbitration and its propensity to give
great deference to the private settlement of disputes arising
under collectively bargained agreements. In the aftermath of the
Steelworker's lrilogy and its progeny, grievance arbitration has
grown to be an integral part of most collective bargaining agreements.5 These self imposed quasi-judicial dispute resolution procedures are desirable for several reasons:
First, Congress has expressed a preference for the private settlement of labor disputes through the grievance arbitration
procedure. Second, arbitration is the more efficient method for
resolving labor disputes, since the Board [National Labor ReR. SMrrH, L. MxRRnuLD, & D.

ROTHSCHD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND

LABOR ARBITRATION 103 (1970).

2 Id.

3Id.

' United Steelworkers of America v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
In 1974 it was reported that 95% of the major collective bargaining agreements provided for the arbitration of grievances. See Cohen, The Search for Innovative Proceduresin Labor Arbitration, 29 ARB. J. 104 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Cohen].
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lations Board] and the courts are now overburdened with labor
related litigation. Third, the arbitrator has a better knowledge
of the law of the shop, which imbues him with greater competency in dealing with labor disputes.6
Labeling these extra-judicial procedures for the settlement of
disputes "arbitration procedures" is somewhat a misnomer. As
the express goal of any such procedure is to settle the dispute
long before the actual arbitration phase is activated, these procedures might more aptly be called dispute settlement procedures.7
As a means of reaching this end, many grievance arbitration procedures begin very informally with perhaps a meeting between
the foreman and the grievant, they then proceed to more formal
levels and finally, and only if necessary, they culminate in
arbitration.8
While the proliferation of grievance arbitration procedures in
American industry is of only introductory importance in this
note, it provides a basic background of the evolution and growing
importance of grievance arbitration procedures in America. This
note concerns the grievance arbitration procedure employed by
the United Mine Workers of America (UMW) and the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association (BCOA): The stability of employer-employee relations in the bituminous coal industry is essential to a resurgence of coal as America's means of survival
during the current energy crisis. To regain its prominence in both
national and international markets, the coal industry must be
both dependable and productive. Neither of these characteristics
can exist in an industry which is unsettled in the area of labor
relations.
The grievance procedure is the very heart of labor-management relations.9 Much has been done during the past decade by
6 Note,

The Ascendency of Labor-Arbitration and the Confusion of Labor

Arbitrators:A Case of CongressionalNeglect, 62 Ky. L.J. 505 (1974).
7 For example, in the 1978 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement [hereinafter cited as 1978 Agreement], the following language appears in Art. XXIII,
Sec. (c): Grievance Procedure: "[a]n earnest effort shall be made to settle such
differences at the earliest practicable time."
* Id. Art. XXI, Sec. (c) (1)-(4).
* As stated by the United States Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of
America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960), "arbitration
is the substitute for industrial strife."
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the UMW and the BCOA to improve the grievance arbitration
procedure used in the coal industry.10 The purpose of this note is
to analyze the effect and efficiency of these changes in the current
procedure. This analysis will focus on the current system's ability
to battle the major deficiencies in any grievance arbitration mechanism: cost and time-lag. The first section will survey the major
changes made in the UMW/BCOA grievance arbitration procedure in the past decade. The second section will discuss the
problems of cost and time-lag as they relate to grievance arbitration generally, with an analysis of the 1978 National Bituminous
Coal Wage Agreement (1978 Agreement) to determine if the parties to that agreement are effectively combating these problems in
the coal industry. The third section of this note will examine the
effectiveness and propriety of the Arbitration Review Board
(A.R.B.), discussing some extra-contractual methods of curing the
inefficiencies of grievance arbitration. Finally, the conclusion will
suggest some changes to improve the current procedure's ability
to operate at optimum efficiency.
I.

GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION IN THE BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY

The 1970's brought a great deal of change to grievance arbitration procedures in the coal industry. The bulk of the restructuring occurred during the negotiation of the 1974 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement (1974 Agreement). These changes,
along with those effectuated by the 1978 Agreement, comprise the
focal point of this analysis.
The grievance procedure used in the coal industry is basically
a five-step process which may be outlined as follows:
1. meeting between foreman and aggrieved party, then
2. settlement is attempted by the mine management and the
mine committee, then
3. the Union's District representative and a representative
10See, e.g., The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements of 1968, 1971,
1974, and 1978. The intent of the two organizations is further evidenced by addresses made by former UMW president Arnold Miller and Joseph Brennan, current president of the BCOA, reprinted in Horvitz, Brennan & Miller, New Approaches to Dispute Settlement, ARBrrRATIoN-1976 at 216-26 (1976); see
generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, TRUTH, Lm DETECTORS, AND OTHER
PROBLEMS IN LABOR ARBITRATION (1978) (Proceedings of the 31st Ann. Meeting of
the Nat'l. Acad. of Arbitrators).
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from management attempt to settle, then
4. the matter goes to arbitration, then
5. appropriate cases may be appealed to the A.R.B."
Several streamlining procedures were made a part of the 1974
Agreement. The meeting between the foreman and the aggrieved
party at step one of the procedure was changed to require that
the foreman render his decision within twenty-four hours." This
element obviously was inserted to expedite the subsequent steps
of the grievance procedure. Another streamlining element of the
1974 Agreement is found in Article XXIII, Section (b)(3), which
makes the compilation of a verbatim transcript contingent on
both parties' agreement. This element has both cost and timesaving implications.
Undoubtedly, the most radical alterations in the grievance
arbitration procedure brought about by the 1974 Agreement occurred at steps four and five. The examination by the four person
board1" was deleted and replaced by arbitration; the appropriate
arbitrator to be chosen from a list of arbitrators compiled for
each UMW District by the presidents of the Operators' Associa14
tion and the International Union.
The changes made at step five of the procedure resulted from
studies of the Joint Committee on Arbitration Procedures which
was established under the 1971 Agreement. 5 The parties provide
in Article XXIII, Section (c)(5) of the 1974 Agreement that arbitration decisions rendered at step four may be appealed to an Arbitration Review Board subject to certain jurisdictional limitations. The A.R.B. was created to act as a "quasi supreme court"
for coalfield arbitrations.' e
The 1978 Agreement is, of course, the controlling document
at this point and therefore will be the subject of analysis, but the
1974 Agreement is still the milestone from an evolutionary stand-

1978 Agreement, Art. XXIII, Sec. (c)(1).
Id.
" 1971 Agreement, Art. XVII, Sec. (b)(4).
14 1978 Agreement, Art. XXIII, Sec. (b)(1).
" 1971 Agreement, Art. XVII, Sec. (c).
16 Horvitz, Brennan & Miller, New Approaches to Dispute Settlement, ARsI1

12

TRATION-1976 at 221 (1976) (address by Joseph P. Brennan, President, Bitumi-

nous Coal Operators' Assoc.).
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point. Notwithstanding the major restructuring done in the 1974
Agreement, the 1978 Agreement initiated some changes of its own
as well as refining some of the concepts in the 1974 Agreement.
The major changes can be enumerated as follows:
(1) The mine committee was given the power to withdraw
any grievance at step two.
(2) Arbitrators were required to render decisions in an expeditious manner, and failure to do so was made grounds
for removal by mutual consent of the appointing parties.
(3) Settlements or withdrawals at step one of the grievance
procedure were held not to constitute a precedent in the
handling of other grievances.
(4) The parties agreed to consolidate cases before one arbitrator where practicable in an effort to achieve the goal of
"... expeditious processing of grievances."
(5) Post-hearing briefs were disallowed except when deemed
necessary by the arbitrator.
(6) The parties agreed to continue the "appellate system"
with a sole umpire as opposed to the three member
panel. 17
This list of important changes is not exhaustive, but contains
those changes most significant and most deserving of evaluation.
Each of these elements of the grievance arbitration procedure has
had some effect on the cost and time-lag associated with each individual grievance.

II. TIME LAG AND COST IN GRIEVANCE

ARBITRATION PROCEDURES

Having outlined the current grievance procedure used in the
coal industry, and noted some of the important changes occurring
recently in that procedure, it is necessary to determine the ability
of this procedure to deal with the problems and inefficiencies associated with all grievance arbitration procedures-time-lag and
cost. To say that time-lag and cost are current problems of grievance arbitration procedures in America is far from original. Indeed, scholars have written extensively purporting to identify
these problems and have suggested methods of trimming both the
time-lag and cost factors.18 This portion of the note will discuss
Id. This is a summary of the important changes made in Art. XXI of the
1978 Agreement.
18 See, e.g., Jaffe, It's Your Money! Cutting the Cost of Labor Arbitration,26
17
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the alleged inefficiencies of grievance arbitration generally and
also analyze the 1978 Agreement to determine to what extent the
UMW and the BCOA are employing these methods to resolve the
problems of cost and time-lag. The problems of cost and time-lag
are interrelated concepts; although they are conceptually distinguishable, one will always affect the other. Most suggestions regarding time-lag, if implemented, would concurrently reduce
costs. Hence, much of the discussion that follows will necessarily
focus on both problems simultaneously.
The cost, as well as the time-lag, of arbitration has been increasing. The average cost of an arbitration has recently been estimated at over two thousand dollars per side;1" and the average
lapse of time from the grievance date to the receipt of the arbitrator's award is over two hundred and twenty days.20 Still, "even
the most formal arbitration proceeding is much faster, less expensive, and more responsive to industrial needs than the best run
courts available today. '21 The median time required to get a case
to trial after filing in federal court is one year. 22 Furthermore, litigation entails attorneys' fees and extensive discovery costs which
can be staggering.23 As a result, there are few who condemn the
arbitration process to the extent that its extinction seems near.24
Arbitration is an efficient process in comparison to its alternative,
litigation, but there is still room for improvement.
Why are costs and time-lag problems in arbitration? One major reason for the time-lag problem is the lack of "competent, experienced, and acceptable arbitrators. '25 It has been estimated
that seventy-five percent of the abritration cases in America are

ARB. J. 161 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe]; Davey, Restructuring Grievance
Arbitration Procedures: Some Modest Proposals, 54 IOWA L. REV. 560 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Davey]. For a more recent evaluation, see Veglahn, Arbitration Costs/Time: Labor and Management Views, 30 LAB. L.J. 49 (1979).
19 Veglahn, Arbitration Costs/Time: Labor and Management Views, 30 LAB.
L.J. 49 (1979).
20

Id.

21

Rubin, Arbitration: Toward a Rebirth, TRUTH,
30, 35 (1978).

LIE DETECTORS, AND OTHER

PROBLEMS IN LABOR ARBITRATION

21 Id. at 34.
" Id. at 35.
24 Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the
Arbitraton Process: A Report With Comments, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1115 (1964).
11 Davey, supra note 18, at 561.
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heard by twenty-five percent of the available arbitrators.2 6 Furthermore, the average age of those experienced arbitrators is fiftyseven. 27 Industry must begin using the younger, more inexperienced arbitrators. While this is recognized as a solution by many,
few are willing to implement it28 Most parties to the arbitration

process feel more secure with older, more experienced arbitrators;
they are, it is urged, more predictable. The net effect of this attitude is that a select group of arbitrators become overburdened
and unable to dispatch cases with the expedience necessary for
effective arbitration. Over use of a few arbitrators obviously contributes to the time-lag problem."
Most of the documented inefficiencies of grievance arbitration contribute both to time-lag and cost. The most significant
and prevalent inefficiencies include the following:
(1) improper screening,
(2) unnecessary use of post-hearing briefs,
(3) unnecessary use of verbatim transcripts,
(4) failure to use adequate pre-hearing techniques aimed at
streamlining the disagreement,
(5) failure to use and develop young, inexperienced
arbitrators1 0
A discussion of the first of these problems associated with grievance arbitration, improper screening, will be deferred to the last
section of the note since it has particular application to the coal
industry.31 The remaining problems will be analyzed in relation to
the 1978 Agreement to determine whether the grievance procedure used in the coal industry is equipped to neutralize these universal problems.
Is the Coal Industry Coping With Time-lag and Cost Problems?
As noted earlier, time-lag and cost problems are characteristic of all grievance arbitration procedures-the UMW-BCOA pro26 Cohen, supra note 5, at 107.
'n

Id.

Davey, supra note 18, at 561.

29 Cohen, supra note 26, at 107.
30 Davey, What's Right and What's Wrong With Grievance Arbitration, 28
Aim. J. 209, 212-14 (1973). See also Davey, supra note 18. These two articles sum-

marize well the current problems in grievance arbitration procedures.
31See text accompanying notes 68-76 infra.
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cedure is no exception. With this in mind, the coal industry's
grievance arbitration procedure can be analyzed to determine its
ability to mitigate the effects of cost and time-lag.
The lack of experienced and acceptable arbitrators 2 is also a
problem in the coal industry. The magnitude of this particular
problem in the coal industry becomes obvious upon a survey of
the lists of panel arbitrators composed pursuant to Article XXIII,
Section (b) of the 1978 Agreement. 3 This survey revealed several
significant points. There is an obvious tendency among coalfield
arbitrators to render their services in more than one district. For
example, in the districts used in this survey, there were sixtyseven available panel positions. Of these sixty-seven possible positions, twenty-eight of them are filled by a small group of arbitrators." In fact, there are twelve arbitrators serving these districts
who are on the panel in one or two other districts.3 5 This situation
is not inherently bad, but to the extent that arbitrators become
more dependent on the coal industry for their livelihood, the
more compromised they may become. At the very least, this possibility offers a good reason for those who choose the panel members to monitor the situation and check its growth. These overlapping arbitrators are obviously good or they would not be so
acceptable to both the union and management; however, an arbitration process loses its value when the arbiter becomes more concerned with the "season record" than with the case at hand. Furthermore, this overlap situation may accentuate the time-lag
problem as the overburdened arbitrators get bogged down with
work and are unable to dispose of cases in a reasonable time. 0
Essentially, the arbitrator supply problem is as much evident in

See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
This survey included the following UMW districts: 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 17, 29, and
one unidentifiable district.
" It has been reported that toward the end of the 1974 Agreement, there
3'

were only seventy-five arbitrators available to fill one hundred and fifty arbitration posts. This may be a closer approximation of the true situation. Valtin, The
Bituminous Coal Experiment, 29 LAB. L.J. 469 (1978).
3 These figures, taken from recent panel lists, may have changed somewhdt
by the date of printing, but the general trend of concentration is fairly represented. In fact, the situation may be more acute than the figures of this survey
suggest since the survey does not include all of the districts.
" See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
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the coal industry as elsewhere.37 Many of the resulting negative
aspects alluded to above could be eliminated if the parties would
actively seek and employ young inexperienced arbitrators." A
greater utilization of these young arbitrators would help alleviate
problems associated with both overlapping and overburdening.
One instance where the 1978 Agreement specifically attempts
to limit the time-lag problem is found in Article XXII, Section
(b)(4). This contract provision states that "[d]istrict arbitrators
shall render decisions in an expeditious manner; failure to do so
may be grounds for removal by mutual consent of the appointing
parties." This provision, while it has no effect on limiting the
number of grievances reaching arbitration, is laudable for its effort to expedite the disposition of the grievance by arbitration.
The underlying purpose of this removal process would seem to be
to urge compliance with Article XXIII, Section (c)(4) of the 1978
Agreement." The extent to which this provision can effectively
expedite the process is greatly limited when viewed in light of the
supply problem discussed earlier. 0 In other words, it may be
counterproductive to remove a great number of arbitrators in
view of the already overlapping and overburdening of the current
panels. Again, a willingness of the parties to utilize the young,
inexperienced arbitrators would seem to be a partial solution to
this dilemma as well.
The grant of authority to the mine committee' 1 to either settle or withdraw any grievance at step two of the grievance process
is one provision of the 1978 Agreement which will have the dual
impact of decreasing both the cost and the time-lag associated
with the coal industry's grievance arbitration procedure. This
clause, in effect, is an additional screening mechanism inserted by
37 Id.
"The author has no statistics on the average age or years of experience of
the panel arbitrators to whom the survey in note 33 was addressed. The coal industry may in fact have many young arbitrators; however, the employment of
these younger and less experienced arbitrators might still be expanded.
39 Art. XXIH, Sec. (c)(4) states in part: "If the arbitrator is unable to make
his decison within 30 days of the close of the hearing, he shall promptly advise the
parties of the reasons for the delay and the date when his decision will be
submitted."

'1 See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
41 Provisions of the 1978 Agreement regrding the mine committee are found
in Art. XXIII, See. (a).
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the parties as a preventive measure. The grant of this authority to
the mine committee might be of significant importance were it
not for the political aspects associated with the committee (and
the union in general). The committee members are elected at
each mine site by the employees of that mine,42 and are therefore
subject to both actual and potential political pressure from their
peers. The effect of a union's political nature on any screening
mechanism is cogently stated as follows:
A union is semi-political in nature. Refusal by a steward to file
a grievance, or by a union representative to press it to arbitration, may, rightly or wrongly, alienate a member who feels he
has a valid grievance, and the financial cost of having an arbitrator say No may be felt less burdensome than the political
cost of having a union officer say it, particularly if a union
election is coming up 48
Perhaps even more significant than the political pressures on the
mine committeeman, are the peer pressures. This was pointed out
in a study done some years ago" and is still relevant today. The
author, after pointing out the economic advantages of committee
membership, noted the following: "[iun spite of these advantages,
the committeeman's position is not always readily filled, and resignations of committeemen are common. The grievance committee comes under attack for delays in processing grievances and for
unfavorable decisions." 45 As a result of these various pressures
under which the committeeman must operate, the grant of authority to the mine committee to withdraw grievances at step two
will probably not have a significant impact on the number of
grievances pressed to arbitration by the union. As a corollary to
all this, it should be pointed out that improper screening also
results from management recalcitrance. 6 The simple solution is
for the union to say "no" to more employee grievances and for
the management officials to say "yes", and admit their wrongs
more often.47 This panacean solution is, however, realistically
42

Id.

43 Jaffe, supra note 18, at 162.
44G. Somers, Grievance Settlement

in Coal Mining (W.V.U. Bull. Ser. 56, No.

12-2, 1956).
45 Id.at 5.
40Jaffe, supra note 18.
7
Id.
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doubtful."8
In addition to the general factors discussed above, some of
the individual stages of the grievance arbitration procedure contain elements which lessen the impact of time-lag and cost on the
coal industry's grievance procedure. A critical discussion of these
factors is important since, unlike the general provisions discussed
above, these have a direct effect on the applicable stage of the
grievance process.
Step one of the grievance procedure4 9 provides that the foreman, after his initial meeting with the aggrieved employee, must
render his decision within twenty-four hours following the day
the complaint is made; furthermore, settlements or withdrawals
at this stage of the procedure do not constitute a precedent in the
handling of other grievances. The first of these, requiring the
foreman to render his decision within twenty-four hours, propels
the unsettled grievance into the "machinery" as quickly as possible. The second provision is the important one. The fact that settlements made by the foreman have no precedential value tend to
make low level settlements more possible. This case-by-case approach allows for varying individual circumstances. It is impossible to evaluate the impact of this provision since there is generally no record made of grievances settled at the first step meeting
between the aggrieved party and the foreman. This contract provision is aimed at the early disposition of grievances. It would
seem, in the long-run, to have the positive effect, however intangible, of lowering the number of cases reaching arbitration during
any given time period.
With the exception of the time limitations, steps two and
three of the grievance procedure have no significant provisions
aimed at battling the time-lag and cost problems. Step four of the
grievance procedure as outlined in the 1978 Agreement urges the
use of case consolidation." Utilization of this procedure could
48Inefficient screening is perhaps the coal industry's most pressing problem.
Education is another approach to solving the pre-arbitration screening problem
and will be discussed in section three infra.
49 1978 Agreement, Art. XXIH, Sec. (c)(1).
60 Art. XXII, Sec. (c)(4) provides in part: "The parties agree that the expedi-

tious processing of grievances is a major function of this Article, and that consolidation of cases before a single arbitrator can aid in achieving that goal, and where
applicable, this procedure should be given serious consideration.... grievance
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have overwhelming effects on both time-lag and costs. An important saving associated with case consolidation is that each party's
presentation of his grievance tends to be shorter and more succinct, this in turn results in arbitral opinions with similar qualities.5 1 The time and cost saving features of this provision are obvious. However, in a system based upon a rotating panel of
arbitrators, like the UMW/BCOA system, the success of such a
feature would seem to be largely a function of what particular
arbitrator happened to be assigned.52 Where relatively long range
consolidation is necessary, the parties will probably be reluctant
to consolidate without knowing which arbitrator will be assigned
via the rotation.53 While this contract provision is noteworthy, the
language is suggestive rather than binding, and this, more than
anything else, will deter its effectiveness.
The last provisions of the 1978 Agreement to be analyzed in
this section may be considered together. Both deal with improving the parties' pre-arbitration activity and not with the arbitration procedure itself. The 1978 Agreement precludes the use of
post-hearing briefs except in cases where the arbitrator deems
such briefs necessary.5 The past insistence on filing post-hearing
briefs may be partly based on a desire to "shore up a shoddy job
of preparation and/or presentation.

'

1

5

This provision should save

time, reduce cost, and insure better preparation on the representatives' part, provided that arbitrators do not abuse their right to
demand briefs." Although this provision indirectly urges better
pending arbitration concerning the same operation of the Employer for which an
arbitrator has not been assigned, shall be assigned to a single arbitrator if such
cases can be heard on the same day, at the same place."
81 Jaffe, supra note 18, at 161.
82 In the belief that arbitrators do tend to split decisions, some parties, especially on the management side, consider it preferable to arbitrate only one issue at
a time, and to insist upon a different arbitrator for each case. See Jones & Smith,
Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticismsof the ArbitrationProcess:A
Report With Comments, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1115, 1149 (1964) [hereinafter cited as

Jones & Smith].
The author observed the records of a major coal producer concerning arbitration decisions rendered under the 1978 Agreement and while case consolidation
had occurred, it seemed both quite infrequent and limited to the presence of a few
arbitrators.
1978 Agreement, Art. XXIII, Sec. (c)(4).

Jaffe, supra note 18, at 175-76.
58 It is interesting to note that the 1978 Agreement allows the arbitrator to
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pre-arbitration preparation, Article XXHI, Section (e) of the 1978
Agreement has direct effects on such preparation. By compelling
the parties to disclose important facts and the contract provisions
supporting their claims, both sides should be able to more adequately focus their oral arguments and case presentation on the
facts in dispute. This of course should lead to a more succinct
hearing which will, in turn, lead to lower overall costs.
The Impact of Step Five-The ArbitrationReview Board
In most grievance procedures, arbitration is the final stage
and the arbitrator's decision is final and binding upon the parties.
In the coal industry, the parties, by virtue of the 1978 Agreement,
may appeal appropriate cases to the Arbitration Review Board
(A.R.B.). The Memorandum of Understanding" contained in the
1978 Agreement, sets out the guidelines, as well as some changes,
for the operation of the A.R.B. during the term of the 1978
Agreement.
The A.R.B. is a "quasi supreme court" of limited jurisdiction."9 The basic purpose of the A.R.B., as evidenced by the predecide whether or not to use post-hearing briefs, especially in light of recent
charges that some arbitrators use the post-hearing brief as a "crutch." One such
allegation states that "there are some arbitrators who make use of briefs as an
escape hatch so that the decision consists of the briefs of the respective parties
quoted in 'full' [in lieu, we suppose, of the arbitrator's own summary and analysis
of the evidence and arguments] and the award." See Jones & Smith, supra note
52, at 1128. Hopefully the panel arbitrators under the National Bituminous Coal
Wage Agreement will not destroy the utility of this contract provision by such
action.
5 Art. XXIH,Sec. (e) states in part: "at all steps of the complaint and the
grievance procedure, the grievant and the Union representative shall disclose to
the company representatives a full statement of the facts and the provisions of the
Agreement relied upon by them. In the same manner, the company representative
shall disclose all the facts relied upon by the company."
" Memorandum of Understanding-Continuance of the Arbitration Review
Board, appended to the 1978 Agreement.
59The Memorandum of Understanding provides that: "Upon receipt of such
petition, the Arbitration Review Board shall review the decision of the district
arbitrator to determine whether grounds for review exist. The Board shall hear
only cases involving
(i) Decisions of a district arbitrator in conflict with one or more decisions of
other arbitrators on the same issue of contract interpretation or in conflict with a
previous decision of the Arbitration Review Board; or
(ii) Decisions involving a question of contract interpretation which has not
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requisites for review, is to lend stability to labor relations in the
coal industry. The decisions of the A.R.B. have precedential value
and this is the key to its ability to create an atmosphere of stability. In this respect, the A.R.B. has had great success. One industry official has said: "Now, once you arbitrate a contractual issue,
it is settled-you know that you will never (during the course of
the 1978 Agreement) have to arbitrate that issue again." 0
The existence of the A.R.B., however, has not been without
its problems. Since its inception in 1974, the A.R.B. has been burdened with a backlog, resulting from the parties' inability to agree
on the membership of the Board for some time.61 Once the tripartite Board was finally named, the petitions for review had
mounted. Furthermore, the backlog and time-lag were increased
when the actual caseload proved to be far greater than that which
the parties had anticipated. 2 Despite these problems, the existence of the A.R.B. obviously has had merit as shown by the
UMW and the BCOA's decision to continue it into the 1978 term.
While the A.R.B. survived the 1978 Agreement, it was not
without change. Most importantly, the parties dropped the concept of the tripartite Board and chose instead to employ a "chief
umpire" system.63 This should have the effect of expediting the
disposition of cases by avoiding the power struggles which
plagued the 1974 tripartite Board." A second important change,
or addition to the appellate stage, is the grant of authority to the
previously been decided by the Board, and which in the opinion of the Board
involves the interpretation of a substantial contractual issue."
The 1978 Agreement deleted the provision of the 1974 Agreement which allowed the Board to review a district arbitrator's decision if it were considered by
the Board to be "arbitrary and capricious, or fraudulent." As a result, the current
Arbitration Review Board has more limited jurisdiction than did the Board under
the 1974 Agreement.
o Interview with an official of a major coal company.
"1Valtin, The Bituminous Coal Experiment, 29 LAn. L.J. 469 (1978).
62 Id.
" Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 58-59.
" 1974 Agreement, Art. XXIII, Sec. (b). Under the 1974 Agreement, there
was a tripartite board consisting of one member chosen by the United Mine
Workers Union, one member chosen by the Operators, and one neutral member
agreed upon by the parties. With this type of organization, the possibility of disagreement between the board members is great. As a result, the change to a "chief
umpire system" should go a long way towards expediting the board's disposition
of cases.
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respective presidents of the UMW and the BCOA to withdraw
any district petition for review filed by their constituents.6 5 If the
parties use this discretion wisely, and in the appropriate cases, it
should also lessen the current case burden upon the Board and
enhance expediency.
One criticism of the A.R.B. is that, instead of flowing with
the trend and "streamlining" its procedure, the coal industry has
effectively drawn the system out by adding yet another stage.
However the A.R.B.'s stability militates the effect of the addition
of another stage in the appellate process. In fact, the long-run
effect should be to lower the total number of grievances reaching
arbitration since the A.R.B.'s decision on any particular issue settles that question conclusively.
These positive aspects of the A.R.B. must be balanced
against the cost of administering the appellate system. According
to the Memorandum of Understanding between the parties in the
1978 Agreement, the Union and the Operator's Association are required to split the cost of the Arbitration Review Board.66 During
the current term of the 1978 Agreement, expenses of the Board
have been approximately $125,000.00 or $60,000-$70,000 per
party.6 7 However the current costs of the A.R.B. are not such an
extravagant price to pay as long as the Board continues to lend
stability to the otherwise chaotic nature of labor relations in the
coal industry.
IEI.

EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL ISSUES AND ANSWERS

Inefficient Screening and the Duty of FairRepresentation
The problems associated with the failure of management and
the union alike to properly screen non-meritorious grievances
were touched on at an earlier point."' That discussion centered
around the omnipotent political nature of unions and the occasional recalcitrance of management. 9 As stated throughout this
note, time-lag and cost are the two major inefficiencies of any
grievance procedure; the major cause of these inefficiencies is that
66

Memorandum of Understanding, supra notes 58-59.

SId.
67 Telephone conversation with an official of the BCOA.
" See text accompanying notes 47-53 supra.
69 Id.
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there are too many grievances being pressed to arbitration. The
simple solution to many of the problems and inefficiencies is effective screening, but for the reason stated below, this solution is
difficult to employ.
The problems associated with improper screening rest, at
v. Sipes7 0
least initially, with the union. There is a force, the Vaca
syndrome, arguably much more powerful than political and peer
pressures, which deters the union from withdrawing those grievances which have little merit and even less significance.
From the Steelworker's Trilogy" evolved the finality rule
which is based on the belief that industrial disputes are best settled in the industrial setting through a mechanism of the parties'
own choosing.7 2 A doctrine rising alongside and in constant conflict with the finality rule has been the doctrine of fair representain
tion. The doctrine of fair representation was first recognized
7 and has
Railroad,
1944 in Steele v. Louisville and Nashville
risen to challenge the finality rule on a more equal footing in recent years. 4 The test" stated in Vaca v. Sipes has not been applied with particular consistency, therefore many unions are apprehensive about withdrawing grievances, especially when
70
71

386 U.S. 171 (1967).
See note 4 supra.

72 Note, Finality and FairRepresentation:Grievance ArbitrationIs Not Final if the Union has Breached its Duty of FairRepresentation, 34 WASH. & LES
L. REv. 309 (1977).
7 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Black union members challenged their union's actions
in agreeing to phase out black firemen. In disallowing this act of discrimination,
the court imposed a dual role on the union: to represent the inferests of the membership as a whole as well as to represent the individual employees of the bargaining unit fairly, impartially, and without hostile discrimination.
71 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). In Vaca an employee's discharge case
was taken through the first four steps of the grievance procedure and then withdrawn before arbitration. The aggrieved employee sued the union for breach of its
duty of fair representation. This contention was rejected by the Court saying that
the duty of fair representation is breached only when the union's conduct is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith," Id. at 190, and further stated that the
"union may not arbitrarily ignore a grievance or process it in a perfunctory manner." Id. at 191. Also adding an important element to construing this duty was the
recent case of Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976), which made
the "finality rule" conditional upon the employee's ability to show a breach of the
duty of fair representation.
75 Id.
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considering the contingent liability left hanging over their heads.
Most unions would rather bear the cost of arbitration than face
the prospect of the staggering costs of litigation on the issue of
fair representation.
The problems and effects associated with the duty of fair
representation as outlined in Vaca and its progeny are beyond
the scope of this note.7 6 The important point is that the problems
with improper screening, at least from the union's viewpoint, are
magnified by the ambiguous standards set out by the court in
Vaca. Despite the indirect effect that the duty of fair representation has on the withdrawal of non-meritorious grievances, union
leaders could take affirmative action to protect themselves from
possible claims of dissatisfied members whose grievances have
been withdrawn. Union leaders should, for example, strive to
treat all related grievances alike. In furtherance of this goal,
union leaders should devise standards at the beginning of each
contract term to guide the unions' decision as to which grievances
are important enough to press to arbitration. Having a documented set of guidelines to aid in these screening decisions would
add objectivity to the decision making process and since the rank
and file would presumably be given a copy of these guidelines, it
would be more difficult for the employee to claim that the withdrawal of his grievance was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
faith.
Furthermore, the union leaders could in each case where a
grievance is withdrawn, articulate the reasons why that particular
grievance was withdrawn. This added feature of documentation
would not only build a record to defend future withdrawals, but
would also provide the aggrieved employee with an explanation of
why his grievance was not pursued. Finally, if the employee is
still dissatisfied and the subject matter of the grievance is relatively serious, the union leaders could give the employee the opportunity to appear at an informal conference to air his complaints. These conferences would provide a time where the union

71 For a good discussion and analysis of the problems associated with the
duty of fair representation, see Note, Finality and Fair Representation: Grievance ArbitrationIs Not Finalif the Union has Breached its Duty of FairRepresentation, 34 WASH. & LEE L. RaV. 309 (1977). See also Rabin, Impact of the
Duty of Fair Representation Upon Labor Arbitration, 29 SYRACUSE L. RPv. 851
(1978).
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officials could explain their action further and hopefully convince
the grievant that pressing the grievance to arbitration would be of
no benefit to him/her or the union.
While these suggestions would go a long way towards increasing the ability of union leaders to effectively screen their grievances, the problem will remain until the courts become more consistent or until the Supreme Court refines the current standard so
as to provide better and more reliable guidance to those upon
whom the job of proper screening rests. In as much as improper
screening is the major cause of much of the inefficiency associated
with grievance arbitration procedures, pressing for consistency in
this area must be a major goal of not only the coal industry, but
of American industry in general. Screening those grievances, once
filed, is the most effective way to improve grievance procedures. A
second solution is to attempt to settle problems before they become grievances. In any attempt to employ this "pre-grievance
strategy," education and cooperation are essential elements.
Education and Cooperation:Examples Worth Following
As of^late, there have been several strong efforts by both
union and management in the coal industry to turn the otherwise
adversarial nature of the grievance procedure into a more cooperative one. A good example of such an attempt is that initiated by
Westmoreland Coal Company's Bullit Mine and UMW District
28.7 Westmoreland's bosses and rank and filers meet regularly on
a roundtable basis to clear the air about common complaints
before they reach the grievance stages. 78 This is the screening
mechanism at its best. The parties can air the problems and evaluate the situation in an atmosphere of cooperation. The program
is highly endorsed by the constituents of both parties, but Mine
Manager Fred "Bear" Lawson states it best: "[W]e discovered an
amazing fact that we all had the same purpose and the same business: mining coal." 1 As a result of the program these parties have
This cooperative program is outlined in Greer, Westmoreland's Pilot Labor
Relations Program: "Taming the Bulldog," 90 UMW J., April 1979, at 18.
78 Id.
79 Id. District 28 UMW Field Representative George Ramey expressed a simi-

lar attitude: "Our grievance load has been cut by at least half since this idea got
off the ground. Just being able to talk things over with the company without a lot
of politics and run-around is probably the main thing behind that. I think we're
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cut their grievance load in half.80 This obvious effect on both cost
and time-lag should put other union and management officials on
notice of the benefits of this cooperative system.
Educational programs as a solution to the screening problems
are being implemented readily by the UMW. Examples of this
push toward education are found in the United Mine Workers
Journal,a publication for the rank and fie. The UMW has attempted to educate its members on the efficient use of the grievance procedure.8 1 These educational inserts, while their effects are
difficult to assess, could have nothing but positive ramifications
on the grievance procedure.
Perhaps the most significant educational program is that
which was instituted on an experimental basis in UMW District
17 and is now spreading to other districts.8 2 The program,
launched by the UMW in cooperation with the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service (FMCS), is aimed at training local mine
committeemen about various contract matters. The topics covered include contract interpretation, grievance handling, arbitration procedures, and labor relations in general.8 3
The program has essentially three phases. In the first phase,
mine committeemen in the various subdistricts receive eightyhours of instruction from trained personnel provided by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service." In phase two, certain
committeemen who have completed phase one are chosen to assist the FMCS instructors in teaching the phase one course to
other miners.8 5 Thereafter, these committeemen who complete
phase two of the program enter phase three, in which they teach
the eighty-hour phase one course to other mine committeemen on
their own.88 Hence, after the initial training of those selected to
continue past the first phase, the program becomes selfonto something that can put the coal industry and this Union ahead 25 years." Id.
80 Id.
81 See, e.g., Grievance Tips for Witnesses, 89 UMW J., Sept. 1978, at 13; How
to Process Health and Safety Grievances, 87 UMW J., May 1-15, 1976, at 4-6.
82 A review of the program and its effectiveness is found in Hudnall, New
Contract Education Program Begins, 87 UMW J., May 1-15, 1976, at 9.
83 Id.
Id.
85Id.
86 Id.
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perpetuating.
In addition to the general areas stated above, the first phase
of instruction is aimed at giving the students a greater degree of
expertise and understanding in the following areas:
-The preparation of witnesses for hearings;
-the differentiation between hearsay and real evidence;
-the burden of proof;
-location of information regarding the nation's labor laws;
and
-- effective communication of the labor relations concept to the
87
membership.
While all of the above objectives are noteworthy, the last one is
characteristic of the program, and the success of this objective is
possibly the most important of all. When mine committeemen begin to look at grievances in light of the overall labor relations concept, the political and peer pressures will become less important;
and the committeemens' authority to withdraw grievances at step
two will be allowed to reach its full potential. Furthermore, to the
extent that the mine committeemen can communicate this labor
relations perspective to the membership, non-meritorious grievances will not be such a problem.
It is in the interest of both the UMW and the BCOA to initiate programs of both the cooperative and the educational nature;
the above examples are but a beginning. While speaking of the
UMW/FMCS education program, one participant summed the
situation up extremely well: "Education of this type has been a
long time coming to the coalfields.... This class is a giant step
on our part in obtaining peace in the coalfields." 88
IV.

CONCLUSION

The various elements of the coal industry's grievance procedure analyzed in this note evidence the attempts made by the
UMW and the BCOA to lessen the impact of the inefficiencies
which are inherent in any grievance arbitration procedure. As all
the inefficiencies associated with grievance arbitration ultimately
affect the cost of these procedures, the apparent goal of the coal
7 Id.
" Id. (comments of class member Jim Walker).
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industry is to decrease the cost of arbitration. The term cost of
arbitration can be viewed in either of two ways, and one's perspective on this term will necessarily affect the means used to attack the problem. Simply stated, the phrase cost of arbitration
has a dual meaning. A decrease in the cost of arbitration can
mean a decrease in the cost per arbitration(i.e., per case), or it
can mean a decrease in the total cost of arbitration during a specified time period.
Viewing the problem of the cost of arbitration from the perspective of total cost provides the best approach, and the one
most likely to produce the desired results. Approaching the problem in this light, it becomes obvious that industry officials must
concentrate on improving the ability of their grievance procedure
to settle disputes without forcing the issue to arbitration.
Many commentators who have addressed the problem associated with grievance arbitration have concentrated on improving
the arbitration phase of the grievance procedure. 9 While improvements are certainly needed at this stage of the process,
greater emphasis must be placed on improvement of the pre-arbitration dispute resolution mechanism.
The inherent value of these preventive strategies is characterized by the several extra-contractual efforts recently initiated
in the coal industry on a more or less individualized basis. These
educational and cooperative programs should become the rule
rather than the exception in the future. The entire industry must
support similar programs if the necessary atmosphere of productivity and stability is to be achieved. Cooperation between the
UMW and the BCOA is imperative if coal is to take its rightful
place among the nation's energy resources.
In addition to the extension of these preventive programs,
there are two contract provisions which might be added to the
1981 Agreement in an effort to further deter the impact of timelag and cost on the grievance arbitration procedure used in the
coal industry89 See, e.g., Davey, supra note 18; Jones & Smith, supra note 52; Cohen,

supra note 5; and Davey, supra note 30. While there has been some discussion of
attempts to improve the pre-arbitration dispute settlement mechanism in the

past, this should be the focal point of future improvements.
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1) An extension of Article XXIII, Section (e) of the current
Agreement to include a requirement that informal pre-hearing
briefs be submitted to the arbitrator at some reasonable time
prior to arbitration.

2) A requirement that the parties meet prior to arbitration,
possibly at the close of the third step of the grievance proce-

dure when it is obvious that the parties are at an impasse. The
purpose of this meeting would be to agree on the particular
facts and issues in dispute. This stipulation would accompany
the informal brief to the arbitrator prior to the hearing.
While these provisions would entail some added time and
cost initially, they would narrow the issues to be considered at the
hearing and provide for a more expedient fifth stage arbitration.
Through these measures the parties might well conclude that
their differences, not being so critical, can be settled without arbitration. Any set of added provisions which would effectively lower
the number of disputes pressed to arbitration would, in the long
run, work to the benefit of the entire coal industry.
As evidenced by the recent report of the President's Coal
Commission, coal has a vital role to play in America's attempt to
combat the current world energy crisis. To rise to this challenge,
the coal industry must become both stable and dependable. The
presence of the Arbitration Review Board has facilitated both of
these characteristics, and its continuance as a part of the industry's grievance procedure is imperative.
The UMW and the BCOA have recognized the major deficiencies in their grievance arbitration procedure and have made
some progress at correcting these problems. Any major restructuring of the current procedure would be a step backward rather
than an improvement. The coal industry's leaders need to concentrate on improving the ability of the current procedure to resolve
disputes, thereby lowering the number of cases reaching
arbitration.
The status of the coal industry's present grievance arbitration procedure is questionable, especially in light of Consolidation
Coal Company's recent resignation from, and return to, the
BCOA and the change in leadership of the UMW. However, despite this uncertainty, the parties to the National Bituminous
Coal Wage Agreement should forge ahead with continued efforts
to correct the backlogs and soaring costs of the grievance arbitra-
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tion procedure in an attempt to create the necessary atmosphere
for a resurgence of the coal industry.
Larry W. Blalock
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